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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
DAVID LEE BARRETT,
Case No. 890435-CA
Defendant/Appellant

Category No.

2

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT DAVID LEE BARRETT

JURISDICTION
This

is an

District Court.

appeal

from

final judgment

entered

by the

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Article

I Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah, which States:

"In

criminal prosecutions the accused shall have . . . the right to
appeal in all cases."

Appellant also seeks review pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. §77-1-6 (1) (g) (1953 as amended), and Rule 3(a),
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
David Barrett (Barrett) was charged with the Third Degree
Felony

of

possession

violating
of

the

marijuana.

Utah

Controlled

Barrett

moved

Substance
to

suppress

Act,
the

marijuana found during a warrantless and non-consensual search

of his car.

Questions of probable cause, exigent circumstances,

and the legality of the search were duly considered by the
Court.

Mr. Barrett's motion to suppress evidence was denied.

The denial of the Motion to Suppress is now appealed.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
Were the necessary exigent circumstances and probable cause
present to justify a warrantless search into Barrett's vehicle
without his consent?
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Const. Art. I, §14.
The right of people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated; and no Warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause supported by Oath or
affirmation, particulary describing the
place to be searched, and the person ori
thing to be seized.
U.S. Const. Amend. IV.
The right of people to be secure in theiijpersons, houses, papers, and effectsj
against unreasonable searches and seizures]
shall not be violated, and no Warrant shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, particulary describing
the place to be searched, and the person or
thing to be seized.
Both constitutional provisions are identical in language
except for punctuation.
Utah Code Ann. §77-23-4(2) (1953 as amended) provides:
(2) When the circumstances make it
reasonable to do so in the absence of an
2

affidavit, a search warrant may be issued
upon sworn oral testimony of a person who is
not in the physical presence of the
magistrate provided the magistrate is
satisfied that probable cause exists for the
issuance of the warrant.
The sworn oral
testimony may be communicated to the
magistrate by telephone or other appropriate
means and shall be recorded and transcribed.
After transcription, the statement shall be
certified by the magistrate and filed with
the court. This statement shall be deemed
to be an affidavit for purposes of this
section.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case:
Defendant appeals the Trial Court's refusal to grant the

Defendant's Motion to Suppress evidence.

This appeal is from a

final Judgment or Decree of the Court.
B.

Course of Proceedings:
On October 28, 1988, David L. Barrett was arrested and

charged

with

Controlled

the

third

Substance

(1953, as amended).

degree

Act,

Utah

felony
Code

of

Ann.

violating

§58-37-8(2)(a)(i)

On November 10, 1988 Mr. Barrett entered a

plea of "not guilty" to all charges against him.
for February

Utah's

Trial was set

23, 1989, at the Juab County Courthouse.

Mr.

Barrett filed a Motion to Suppress and on February 22, 1989 a
Suppression Hearing was held before the Court.

Mr. Barrett's

Motion to Suppress was denied.
Mr. Barrett conditionally changed his plea to "No Contest,"
as provided in Sery, infra,

which gives Mr. Barrett the right to

appeal the Court's Suppression ruling and to withdraw his plea
if it is determined on appeal that the Motion to Suppress should
have been granted.
to

Sentence

on

On June 6, 1989, the Court granted a Motion

the

next

lower

category

of

offense.

No

certificate of probable cause issued and Defendant has served
his jail sentence, is paying his fine, and is on probation.
C.

Disposition in Court Below:
Mr. Barrett was found guilty of a Class A Misdemeanor of

unlawful possession of a controlled substance and sentenced to
serve one year in the Juab County Jail and to pay a fine of
$500.00

and

$125.00

to the Victim's Reparation

Fund.

Mr.

Barrett's jail sentence was suspended and he was required to
serve sixty days in jail and to be on probation for eighteen
months.

The District Court's final disposition remains that Mr.

Barrett is guilty of a Class A Misdemeanor.
D.

Statement of Facts:
Appellant, David Barrett (Barrett), was the driver of the

second

of

two

cars pulled

over by

Sergeant

Paul

Mangelson

(Mangelson), Utah Highway Patrol, on October 28, 1988, on 1-15
in Nephi, Utah (Hearing Transcript, hereinafter T. 4-6).
vehicles were

not traveling

together

(T. 7,53).

claimed he pulled the vehicles over for speeding
Police backup arrived within

10 minutes

(T. 9 ) .

The

Mangelson
(T. 5,16).
Defendant

claimed he was not speeding and that speeding was a pretext for
4

the stop (T. 48-49, 60).
requested

his

driver's

Mangelson first approached Barrett,

license

and

registration, which

received, and spoke with Defendant briefly (T. 6) .

was

Mangelson

then approached the first car driven by Timothy Sandifer, who
consented to a search of his vehicle (T. 61). Mangelson found a
large duffel bag of raw marijuana in the trunk, unpacked it and
arrested Mr. Sandifer (T. 6). Mangelson then returned and spoke
with Mr. Barrett concerning his origin and destination (T. 6-7).
During their conversation, Mangelson felt that Mr. Barrett was
quite nervous (T. 14-16).
A short distance away, sitting on the 'ground, was the 60
lbs. of raw unpacked marijuana found in Mr. Sandifer's car (T.
32) .

Mangelson told Barrett that the gentlemen in front of him

had a large quantity of marijuana in his trunk and that he could
still smell it.

He then asked for Barrett's consent to search

Barrett's car "to be sure that I am not smelling it from up
there," indicating Sandifer's car (T. 7,21).

Barrett refused to

consent to the search of his vehicle (T. 8,14,22,56); Defendant
told Mangelson: "No, I don't want you looking through it." (T.
8).

Defendant's refusal made Mangelson "suspicious."

(T. 14).

Sergeant Mangelson then proceeded to search the car anyway.
He reached into the car, took the keys, walked to the trunk of
the car, and over the objection of Mr. Barrett opened the trunk
(T. 15-16,56); and searched the contents of the trunk (T. 8,14).
5

Mangelson said his probable cause was Defendant's nervousness
and the smell of marijuana (T. 22) .
In the trunk of Mr. Barrett's vehicle, Sergeant Mangelson
found a duffel bag containing marijuana (T. 8) .

The marijuana

was individually packaged in small zip-loc plastic bags (T. 50)•
These small bags were then insulated from each other by the use
of baking soda, an odor suppressing agent (T. 31-32, 50).
plastic

zip-loc

bags

were

then

packaged

in

several

The

larger

garbage bags, each garbage bag being insulated from the others
with baking soda.

In all, the marijuana was sealed in no less

than five layers of plastic, each insulated with baling soda,
packaged inside of the duffel bag (T. 32,50).
Mangelson testified at the Suppression Hearing that he had
probable cause to search the vehicle because he could smell raw
marijuana

(T.

probable

cause,

7,11).

However,

Mangelson

when

testified

questioned

that

he

did

regarding
not

have

sufficient probable cause to arrest Barrett prior to conducting
a search, as follows:
Q: Why did you not arrest David prior to
searching his trunk?
A:

What would I arrest him for?

Q:

Possession of marijuana?

A:

Well, I didn't know that he possessed it. (T.23).

The trooper went on to state "I haven't got anything to

6

arrest him for under New York v. Belton, which is a smell case
similar to this one." (T. 23-24).
The officer stated that he was justified in conducting a
search because of exigent circumstances which existed at the
time

(T.

23).

When

asked

specifically

circumstances existed, Mangelson replied:

what

exigent

"Well it is a highway

stop." (T. 23).
Mangelson failed to notice that the vehicle identification
number (VIN) on the registration which he held in his hand did
not match the VIN on Mr. Barrett's vehicle (T. 2 6-27) .
was

a

clerical

error

arising

at

Wyoming's

DMV

The VIN

(T. 57).

Mangelson subsequently testified that such a discrepancy would
have justified his seizing and impounding the vehicle (T. 27) .
Mangelson also testified that he made no attempt to obtain
a radio or telephonic search warrant because, he had "done lots
of searches like this and never had any problem with them," and
in

his

sole

necessary."

discretion,

"he

really

didn't

feel

it

was

(T. 26), and although he knew the procedure was

available to him, "I have never did it" (T.25).
Upon
Suppression

completion

of

the

evidence

presented

in

the

Hearing, and the Judge's brief adjournment, the

Court held that the stop was not pretextual, the alleged smell
of marijuana constituted sufficient probable cause, (T. 81-82)
and exigent circumstances existed justifying the warrantless
7

entry into the trunk of Barrett's vehicle (T. 82-83).

The Judge

said that Mangelson could smell the marijuana through all of the
plastic

bags

and

odor

suppressing

agents,

(T. 83)

because

Mangelson had a "superior nose to the ordinary human being with
regard to the smell of marijuana,"

(T. 82).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Warrantless searches are unreasonable per

se

unless they

fall within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement of
the Fourth Amendment1967);

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357

State v. Coal, 674 P.2d 119, 123 (Utah 1983).

automobile

searches

frequently
to

fall

obtaining

within
a

the

search

Although
exigent

circumstances

exception

warrant,

automobiles per

se do not obviate the requirement of a warrant.

Where there are no compelling and exigent circumstances, the
search of an automobile requires a warrant.
In

the

instant

case,

the

warrantless

search

of

Mr.

Barrett's vehicle was unconstitutional because there were no
exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless search.
police

officer

could

have

impounded

the car

The

or obtained a

warrant by making radio contact with a magistrate as provided
for by statute.
did

not

The vehicle identification number on the car

correspond

with

the vehicle

registration, thus the

police officer had the ability to impound the vehicle.

8

The

vehicle could have been in custody thus eliminating any chance
of escape or destruction of evidence.
Also,

the

impractical.
available

to

obtaining

of a warrant would

A warrant, issued through
the

police

officer.

not have been

radio contact, was

Rather

than

ignore the

requirement for a search warrant altogether, the police officer
should have obtained a warrant by police radio.

This procedure

would have been in harmony with the U.S. Const. Amend. IV, Utah
Const. Art. I, §14, Utah Code §77-23-4(2) (1980).
The Utah telephonic warrant statute, cited above, provides
an independent state ground for requiring a warrant in this
case.
However, a warrant could not have been obtained, and a
search should not be justified, because there was no probable
cause to believe that Defendant possessed controlled substances.
The police officer based his probable cause for the search on
"nervousness" and his alleged smell of marijuana.

Nervousness

is not grounds for probable cause, State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935
(Utah 1988) .

In fact, nervousness may be given no weight in

determining reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

State v.

Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1988); State v. Dorsev, 731 P.2d
1085, 1088 (Utah 1986).
of probable cause.

Therefore, smell was the sole element

Smell may have been on the officer's hands

from unpacking 60 lbs. of marijuana from the Sandifer car, or as
9

the officer suspected, the smell may have been coming from the
Sandifer car or the unpacked marijuana sitting a short distance
away.

Smell was never confirmed by a drug sniffing dog, or

otherwise.

Therefore, probable cause was lacking.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUPPRESS THE
EVIDENCE FOUND DURING A WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S
VEHICLE BECAUSE THERE WERE NO EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES.
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I
§ 14 of. the Utah Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and
seizures and require searches to be done pursuant to a valid
search

warrant

issued

by

an

impartial

magistrate.

This

requirement is binding on the states as well as the federal
government.

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

In Wong Sun v.

United States. 371 U.S. 471 (1963) the Court broadened this rule
by stating that evidence tainted by failure to secure a warrant
is to be suppressed.
"Warrantless searches are unreasonable per

se

unless they

fall within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement of
the Fourth Amendment.

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357

(1967); State v. Coal, 674 P.2d 119, 123 (Utah 1983) (
. State v.
Holmes, 107 Ut.Adv.Rpts 74, 76 (Ct. App., 1989).
Only in a few specifically established and well delineated
exceptions may a warrantless search be performed.
10

State v.

Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347,

357

(1967).

One

such

exception

is

the

"automobile

exception" established in Carrol v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925) .

The "automobile exception" applies where a vehicle is

readily mobile, the occupants are alerted and the obtaining of a
warrant would allow the suspects to escape or destroy their
incriminating evidence.

Under these conditions the requirement

for a warrant is relaxed.
In Carrol v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1924) the
Supreme Court authorized warrantless searches of automobiles if
the car is so moveable at the time that the car's contents may
never be found again if a warrant must be obtained.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 43

(1970).

Chambers v.

This search is valid only on

the additional condition that a warrant would have been issued
(as determined by an after the fact review of the circumstances)
subject

to

determined

review
that

in a motion

to

a warrant would

suppress; and

not have been

evidence seized in the search must be suppressed.

if

it is

issued, the
If a warrant

should have been obtained, the evidence must be suppressed.
Although exigent circumstances apply to automobiles more
often than anything else, the presence of exigent circumstances
cannot be assumed but must be compelling before a warrantless
search is justified.

Exigent circumstances do not exist when

the automobile is in custody or is no longer highly mobile.
11

Neither are there exigent circumstances where there is not a
high probability that the car's contents will be lost if a
See Chambers, supra.

warrant is obtained.

In Coolidae v. New

Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461-462
word 'automobile#

(1971), the Court said "The
I
is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth

Amendment fades away and disappears." (emphasis added)

See also

State

(Wilkins

v.

Griffin.

626

P.2d

478,

482

(Utah

1981)

concurring).
In this case, Defendant's vehicle was searched without a
warrant

when

there

were

no

exigent

circumstances.

The

warrantless search was unjustified for two reasons.
First, it would not have been impractical for the police
officer to obtain a warrant; and evidence would not be lost
while a warrant was being obtained.

Warrants are now, and were

at the time of the search, available by radio or telephone and
are authorized by statute.

Utah Code Ann. §77-23-4(2) (1953 as

amended) provides:
(2) When the circumstances make it
reasonable to do so in the absence of an
affidavit, a search warrant may be issued
upon sworn oral testimony of a person who is
not in the physical presence of the
magistrate provided the magistrate is
satisfied that probable cause exists for the
issuance of the warrant.
The sworn oral
testimony may be communicated to the
magistrate by telephone or other appropriate
means and shall be recorded and transcribed.
After transcription, the statement shall be
certified by the magistrate and filed with
the court. This statement shall be deemed
12

to be an affidavit for purposes of this
section. Id. (Addendum 1)
A search warrant could have been authorized by an impartial
magistrate

through

radio

contact.

Mangelson

could

have

requested a "telephone patch" through dispatch.

The call would

have

transcription.

been

Mangelson

automatically

recorded

easy

knew this procedure was available but he

didn't feel it was necessary."
"done

for

lots

of

searches

(T.26).

like this"

Mangelson said he had

and with

telephone warrant "I have never did it."

"really

regard

to the

(T.25).

The officer has no excuse for not obtaining a warrant.

Our

Supreme Court has said:
Telephone warrants are provided for in Utah
Code Ann. §77-23-4 (1982).
The government
should
actively
encourage
its
law
enforcement agents to seek search warrants
whenever possible and by any available means
provided by statute.
Judicial officers
should cooperate to the utmost in promoting
this policy.
Ashe, supra,

59.

Justices Durham and Zimmerman went further in their dissent
by stating that the prosecution must prove unavailability of a
telephone

warrant, and

this theory was not

opposed

by the

majority.
INDEPENDENT STATE GROUNDS:

Our Supreme Court and Court of

Appeals has repeatedly urged counsel to brief the Court on the
State Constitutional issues.

State v. Earl, 716 P. 2d 803, 80513

06

(Utah 1986).

Several bases for such analysis have been

recognized.
For example, state grounds may be applicable to eliminate
conflicts of different jurisdictions on the same issue.
v.

Ashe,

supra,

(Justice

Durham

dissenting).

State

However,

in

Barrett7s case, my office has only found consistent law that
exigent circumstances did not exist, a search warrant should
have been obtained, and the evidence should be suppressed.
When one reads Utah Code Ann. §77-23-4 (1982) , in harmony
with Utah Const. Art. I, §14, it creates an independent state
ground

upon

exigencies

which

a

exist.

search

may

It

Defendant's

is

be

conducted

when

position

alleged

that

the

prosecution has the burden of proving both exigent circumstances
and the unavailability of a reasonable warrant procedure before
a

warrantless

constitution.

search

is

permissible

under

our

state

I believe this is very well supported by all

Justices in Ashe.
The second reason a warrantless search was unjustified was
because the vehicle identification number on the car did not
correspond with the automobile registration and therefore the
police officer could have seized and impounded the car.
would no longer be mobile.

The car

During the time that the car would

have been impounded, the police officer could have petitioned
for a search warrant.
14

When the chances of escape or loss of evidence are no
longer compelling, the exigent circumstance exception to the
Fourth Amendment

is no longer applicable.

Such is the case with Mr. Barrett.

supra.

Chambers,

Mr. Barrett had no chance of

escape while the police officer obtained a warrant.

A warrant

obtained by radio would have required only minutes.

Mr. Barrett

would

the

have

been

under

constant

surveillance

by

police

officer and his back-up while the warrant was being issued.
Also, the police officer had the ability to impound the car.

If

the police officer had done this, then obtained a warrant, Mr.
Barrett's

constitutional

protection

against

unreasonable

searches and seizures would not have been violated.
The fact that the police officer chose not to, or through
poor procedure failed to, take advantage of a radio warrant or
to look carefully at the vehicle identification number of the
car and registration does not excuse the police officer any more
than if the officer failed to obtain a warrant to search a
house.

The fact that he discovered incriminating evidence and

that the officer "did no more than [he] might properly have done
with prior judicial sanction" does not outweigh Mr. Barrett's
constitutional

protection

against

unreasonable

searches

and

seizures and the Court should not "retroactively validate [the
officer's] conduct."

Katz at 356.

15

Because

the

police

officer

failed

to

obtain

a

search

warrant, either by radio or by impounding the car and obtaining
a warrant through normal processes, the police officer violated
the Federal and State Constitutions prohibiting this type of
unreasonable searches and seizures.

The evidence obtained as a

result of this search, therefore, should have been suppressed.
For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, the search of Mr.
Barrett's

automobile

and

seizure

of

its

indistinguishable from Coolidae and Griffin.

contents

are

In those cases the

Court said that where there is no danger to the police officer
or danger of the criminal escaping or destroying the evidence,
there is nothing to invoke the rule of Carrol v. United States.
"[B]y no possible stretch of the legal imagination can this be
made

into a case where "it is not practicable to secure a

warrant," Carrol supra, at 153...and the "automobile exception,"
despite its label, is simply irrelevant.

Coolidae, 403 U.S. at

462; State v. Griffin, 626 P.2d at 482."
Although there was contraband, there was no opportunity to
destroy

it before

a warrant

could be obtained

circumstances did not exist.
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and

exigent

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUPPRESS THE
EVIDENCE SEIZED AS A RESULT OF A SEARCH OF MR. BARRETT'S
VEHICLE BECAUSE OF LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE.
Perhaps the reason the arresting officer failed to obtain a
search warrant, or present his probable cause to a magistrate,
was because the probable cause was insufficient to support the
issuance of a search warrant or a warrantless search of the car.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
the Utah Constitution require that search warrants be issued
only upon probable cause.

The exigent circumstance exception to

the rule requiring a warrant before a search does not escape the
requirement of probable cause.
Probable cause is defined by Black7s Law Dictionary as
"reasonable

cause:

having

more

evidence

for than against."

Mangelson testified that his probable cause to search the
vehicle was Defendant's extreme nervousness and the smell of
marijuana.

(T. 22)

Physical manifestations of nervousness were

Barrett's trembling hands (T. 15) , and "the artery on the side
of his neck was pulsing, you could take his pulse rate there on
the side of his neck."

(T. 15).

In State v. Mendoza, supra,

State v. Sery, supra,

the Court

set forth a standard of review requiring whether a person's
apparent nervousness was any different from that observed in
17

countless travelers —

or if nervousness existed at all.

As

admitted by Mangelson, and I believe as objective knowledge
entitled to judicial notice, almost everyone's hands shake when
they are pulled over by a police officer, and being able to take
the pulse on someone's neck is a well known medical fact.
provided

in Mendoza, supra,

Serv, supra,

and

these

As

factors

should not be given any weight by the Court in determining
whether the officer had probable cause to conduct a warrantless
search.
The officer claims that he could smell raw marijuana in
Defendant's

car.

Under

the

circumstances,

it

would

be

practically impossible for him to smell the marijuana, and it is
far more likely that if he did smell marijuana at all he was
smelling the marijuana from the Sandifer vehicle parked a short
distance up the road with 60 lbs. of raw marijuana unpacked in
bulk, and sitting in the open.

Officer Mangelson must have had

the smell of marijuana on his hands, having unpacked 60 lbs. of
raw marijuana within the last few minutes.

The marijuana in Mr.

Barrett's vehicle was packaged in approximately 3 0 small zip-loc
plastic bags surrounded by 6 to 10 garbage bags each insulated
with odor suppressing agents.

Although the police officer has

been trained to detect marijuana, to accept the police officer's
claim that he could smell marijuana through so much insulation
is clearly erroneous.

To allow the trial Court to find that
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the police officer had such a superior nose that he can smell
substances packaged in such a way as to be smell-proof would
give undue credibility to the police officer and perverts our
legal system.
As previously stated, Mangelson admitted that he did not
know that Barrett possessed marijuana (T. 23)

He went on to say

that he has nothing to arrest Barrett for under New York v.
Belton, supra,
23-24).

"which is a smell case similar to this one"

(T.

It should be noted that there are no other smell cases

similar to this one.

The County attorney cited numerous cases

to the Court, all of which included the fact of recently burned
marijuana, example Cole v. State, 728 P.2d 492 (Okl.Cr. 1986).
The

only

case

which

has

provided

for

raw marijuana

odors

constituting probable cause, would be State v. Groves, 649 P.2d
366 (Hawaii 1982), wherein readily apparent marijuana odors were
confirmed by a drug sniffing dog prior to the police obtaining a
search warrant.

Likewise, in Sery, supra,

the investigating

officers obtained a search warrant after a drug sniffing dog
cued on Sery's baggage.
The common theme running through these cases, is that smell
alone may justify further inquiry, such as a drug sniffing dog,
to help support a finding of probable cause in the issuance of a
search warrant.
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If we are to validate any police search based upon an
alleged smell, there would be no check against police officers
performing warrantless searches of automobiles where they are
only pretextual.

An officer could claim he smelled marijuana

without fear of disbelief by the Court.

With this guaranteed

credibility,

search

the

police

can

stop

and

any

person.

Unfortunately, the only time we learn about these types of
searches is when incriminating evidence is found.

Mangelson

himself said he makes warrantless searches all the time (T.
25,26) and that he does not report negative searches.

We have

no way of knowing whether he actually did smell the marijuana
because fruitless searches are not reported.

The officer can

justify any search by merely claiming after the fact that he
smelled marijuana, when in fact he did not.
We cannot
Amendments

ignore "the overriding purpose of the Fourth

provisions

prohibiting

unreasonable

searches

and

seizures...to safe guard personal privacy against arbitrary and
unwarranted

intrusions by governmental officials."

State v.

Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 190 (Utah 1986), Cert, denied, 480 U.S.
930 (1987).
The fact that there was marijuana in the trunk of the car
does

not

mean

that

the

police

officer

could

smell

it,

(especially under the facts and circumstances of this case).
Article I §14 of the Utah Constitution was intended to eliminate
20

this

type

of

conduct.

To

give

this

kind

of

unchecked

credibility to the officer, especially where it is so obvious
that he could not have smelled the marijuana, would thwart and
undermine the very purpose of these consitutional provisions.
CONCLUSION
The warrantless search of Mr. Barrett's vehicle violated
the constitution of the United States and of the State of Utah.
The evidence found as a result of the illegal search should
therefore have been suppressed and the decision of the Trial
Court should be reversed.
The Trial Court's decision should also be reversed because
it was clearly erroneous and was an abuse of discretion.

To

accept that the police could smell marijuana under the existing
circumstances is specious.

This unchecked credibility given to

police officers would eliminate any protection against random
searches.
For the above reasons, the Trial Court's decision should be
reversed

and

the evidence

seized

during

the

illegal

search

should be suppressed and the case remanded or dismissed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this SlaT day of November, 1989.

K
De fendant/Appel1ant
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ADDENDUM 1

ADDENDUM 1
Utah Code Annotated §77-23-4(2) (1953 as amended)
EXAMINATION OF COMPLAINANT AND WITNESSES WITNESS NOT IN PHYSICAL PRESENCE OF MAGISTRATE DUPLICATE ORIGINAL WARRANTS - RETURN.
When the circumstances make it reasonable to do so in the
absence of an affidavit, a search warrant may be issued upon
sworn oral testimony of a person who is not in the physical
presence of the magistrate provided the magistrate is satisfied
that probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant.

The

sworn oral testimony may be communicated to the magistrate by
telephone or other appropriate means and shall be recorded and
transcribed.

After

transcription,

the

statement

shall

certified by the magistrate and filed with the court.

be

This

statement shall be deemed to be an affidavit for purposes of
this section.

